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Abstract
Across the European Union, the receipt of agricultural subsidisation is increasingly being predicated on the delivery of public 
goods. In the English context, in particular, these changes can be seen in the redirection of money to the new Environmental 
Land Management scheme. Such shifts reflect the changed expectations that society is placing on agriculture—from some-
thing that provides one good (food) to something that supplies many (food, access to green spaces, healthy rural environ-
ment, flood resilience, reduced greenhouse gas emissions). Whilst the reasons behind the changes are well documented, 
understanding how these shifts are being experienced by the managers expected to deliver on these new expectations is less 
well understood. Bourdieu’s social theory and the good farmer concept are used to attend to this blind spot, and to provide 
timely insight as the country progresses along its public goods subsidy transition. Evidence from 65 interviews with 40 
different interviewees (25 of whom gave a repeat interview) show a general willingness towards the transition to a public 
goods model of subsidisation. The optimisation and efficiency that has historically characterised the productivist identity is 
colouring the way managers are approaching the delivery of public goods. Ideas of land sparing and land sharing (and the 
farming preference for the former over the latter) are used to help understand these new social and attitudinal realities. The 
policy implications of these findings are discussed, with reference to the new scheme’s ‘priority themes’.
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Abbreviations
EU  European Union
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy
Defra  Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs
AES  Agri-environment scheme
GHGs  Greenhouse gases
ELM  Environmental Land Management
NE  Natural England
ES  Environmental Stewardship
ELS  Entry Level Stewardship
Introduction
Catalysed by the Brexit process, England is set to experi-
ence major shifts in the design of its agricultural subsidy 
system (Helm 2017). Of these, the changes to the provision 
of direct agricultural subsidisation, historically financed 
and delivered through Pillar One of the European Union’s 
(EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), are amongst of 
the most significant. England’s Department for the Environ-
ment and Rural Affairs (Defra) have revealed the direction 
of travel for the country’s system of farm subsidies. Direct 
payments are to be tapered off over the 2021–2027 transi-
tion period, with the money being redirected to an ambitious 
agri-environment scheme (AES): Environmental Land Man-
agement (ELM). In describing these plans, Defra has availed 
of language that reveals the principles behind the changes. 
The scheme will “free up” (Defra 2018a, p. 7) funds from 
the current subsidy model in which payments are “skewed 
towards the largest landowners and are not linked to any 
specific public benefits” (Defra 2018a, p. 5).
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These dynamics reveal the changing expectations that 
civic society is projecting onto the farming sector. Namely, 
as something whose worth is rooted exclusively in its capac-
ity to produce food to something valued for its provision of 
recreational spaces for an increasingly urbanised population 
(Oueslati and  Salanié 2011), a healthy rural environment 
(Kantelhardt 2006), reduced contribution to greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGs; Westhoek et al. 2013) and the protection 
of cultural landscape features (Junge et al. 2011).
The idea of public goods can be used to help conceptu-
alise these changes. Public goods are things that are non-
excludable and non-rival (something that is available to all, 
irrelevant of who has accessed the supply of the good, or to 
what extent it has been accessed) (Cooper et al. 2009). The 
need to encourage behaviours that provides public goods 
arises because of the market failure to supply them autono-
mously (Jaffe et al. 2005). So, whilst the agricultural indus-
try is being valued for its capacity to provide public goods 
(Arriaza et al. 2004; Zasada 2011), without appropriate 
intervention, land managers are unable or unwilling to sup-
ply them (Hodge 2000). The need is most clear in the context 
of agriculture’s biodiversity and GHG footprint (Buller and 
Morris 2004; Nelson et al. 2010; Willett et al. 2019). These 
anxieties and ambitions are manifest across ELMs scheme 
policy briefings (Defra 2020a), the UK Government’s 25 
Year Environment Plan (Defra 2018b) and the Agriculture 
Bill and Environment Bill (see, for example, Houses of Par-
liament 2020).
By making the full receipt of direct payments contingent 
on minimum environmental standards, and by offering AESs 
that remunerate the voluntary adoption of environmental 
management practices, the public goods model is one that 
has already, in part, been operationalised (Dobbs and Pretty 
2004; Meyer et al. 2014). The sorts of changes being made 
through the Brexit process can be seen as part of more long-
standing shifts in agricultural policy design (Wilson 2001; 
Ward et al. 2008).
What is significant, though, is the speed and scale of the 
overhaul. As it stands, 61% of farm business income in Eng-
land is derived from direct agricultural subsidisation (Defra 
2018d), without which 42% of the country’s farms would not 
be profitable (Defra 2018c). Reliance on direct support var-
ies across farm systems—with poultry, pig and horticultural 
units most profitable without support, and cereals, mixed and 
grazing units typically loss making without it (Defra 2018c). 
There are major worries around the viability of constituent 
farm businesses, and the sector as a whole (Hubbard et al. 
2018), not least because of the modest adjustment period 
afforded to the country’s farmers (with CAP payments guar-
anteed only up until the end of 2022).
To contextualise the challenge of the transition in another 
way, uptake figures for targeted AES contracts are also 
instructive. By the end of 2018, just 1.6 m ha—18% of the 
country’s agricultural land—was being managed under a 
targeted AES scheme contract (National Statistics 2019). 
In contrast, Defra hopes that 82,500 land managers will be 
enrolled into ELMs by 2028 (NAO 2019)—around three 
quarters of the country’s farm holdings. Although it will be 
the only support available (compared to previous voluntary 
schemes that have sat alongside direct Pillar One support), 
ELMs must be able to attract significantly more of the coun-
try’s farmers if it is to deliver on the scale of public goods 
being asked of it.
These dynamics are introducing a new urgency to the 
study of how farming attitudes and identities interface with 
the delivery of non-agricultural goods. What are the sec-
tor’s attitudes towards the provision of public goods, and 
how might these attitudes shift as other forms of support are 
removed? Insofar as they are going to be the major provid-
ers of these varied public goods, farmers’ attitudes towards 
their provision will be an important determinant in the suc-
cess of the new-look breed of agricultural regime (Howley 
et al. 2014).
The aim of the paper is to add a timely insight into these 
questions, and to look into the dangers and opportunities 
manifest in the country’s agricultural policy transition. The 
paper is adding to the nascent literature dedicated to under-
standing how the public goods model is being experienced 
by the land managers at the front line of the agricultural 
policy transition. It is looking to compliment the largely 
quantitative survey work done in this area (Howley et al. 
2014; Kvakkestad et al. 2015) with research predicated on 
a qualitative in-depth interview methodology and the ‘good 
farmer’ concept. In doing so, the paper is also able to con-
tribute to ongoing sociological inquiry into the identities 
and attitudes represented in the farming sector. The paper 
uses England as a case study, although given the political 
and social factors common across the devolved nations, the 
findings have broader UK-relevance. Similarly, as the EU 
reflects on the potential merits of prioritising public goods in 
its own subsidy system (Czyzewski and Stepien 2018; EPRS 
2018; Vilke and Gedminaite-Raudone 2018), the paper is 
able to speak to broader EU dynamics.
Conceptualising the ‘good farmer’ and public 
goods subsidisation
Whilst there is willingness amongst the general public to 
pay land managers for the provision of public goods (Kal-
las et al. 2007), the attitudes of the farmers towards the 
landscapes associated with their provision have historically 
been less favourable (Lobley and Potter 2004; Howley et al. 
2012). There is a lag between the policy changes that are 
re-orientating agricultural subsidies from agricultural pro-
duction to the provision of public goods, and the farmers’ 
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internalisation of the identities those policy changes imply 
(Gorton et al. 2008). This is especially pertinent for the sup-
ply of environmental goods and the un-farmed appearances 
with which they are associated (Burton 2004).
The body of research revolving around the ‘good farmer’ 
concept is well placed to shed light on how farming identi-
ties interface with the prospect of engaging in public goods-
orientated subsidisation. The concept reveals the farming 
styles that are held in high esteem by agricultural commu-
nity, and the varied motivational factors that influence prac-
tice. The behaviours associated with the good farmer are not 
necessarily those that deliver the highest economic returns, 
but can be about the meeting of other existential, stylistic or 
moral goals (Silvasti 2003). Whilst some behaviour may be 
amply remunerated (say through subsidisation), if that prac-
tice, or if the landscape that practice creates, is in conflict 
with other objectives, there will be a resistance towards its 
adoption (Burton et al. 2008).
Earlier papers using the concept revealed an incompat-
ibility between the landscape preferences of the farming 
community and the management practices promoted through 
AES schemes (Burton 2004). Farmers’ productivist ideals 
of high yields and intensification were antithetical to the 
removal of land from production, and the adoption of less 
intensive management practices (Burton 2004). The lack of 
skill and expertise associated with delivering the scheme 
options, combined with their high visibility also meant the 
schemes were experienced as lost opportunities to demon-
strate their farming competence, and so represented a cultur-
ally unattractive prospect (Burton et al. 2008; Burton and 
Paragahawewa 2011).
Through changing conditions in agricultural economics 
and widening awareness around the environmental issues 
associated with intensive agriculture, that cultural resistance 
has abated (Sutherland and Darnhofer 2012). The price pre-
miums associated with organic produce, for example, have 
facilitated an increased respect for those pursuing an organic 
model as a means of improving a farm’s economic viability 
(Sutherland 2013). The same changes have been experienced 
with regards to participation in an AES. Due to the economic 
benefits a scheme contract can secure, and due to the grow-
ing recognition of the skill required to deliver the constituent 
management practices, participation in an AES has become 
a fruitful opportunity to attract the respect of farming peers 
(Riley 2016). In this social and economic setting, environ-
mental negligence rather than environmental proactivity has 
become associated with a loss of prestige (Cusworth 2020).
Such research is predicated on the sense that a given 
manager’s farming decisions are being scrutinised by other 
members of their community (Seabrook and Higgins 1988; 
Moran et al. 2013). Such social evaluation is as an important 
feature in the suite of motivational factors that influences 
a given land manager’s decision-making process (Kuhfuss 
et al. 2016). To help capture this socialised aspect of the 
farmers’ decision-making processes, most of the work in 
the good farmer literature is carried out with the theoretical 
underpinning of Bourdieu’s social theory.
Bourdieu explains how individuals, who occupy space 
in a given ‘field’, look to achieve favourable social stand-
ing through the reproduction of symbolic capital (Bourdieu 
1986; Hilgers and Mangez 2015). Symbolic capital is itself 
generated through possession of three other forms of capi-
tal: economic, social and cultural. Economic capital is the 
type typically and most readily understood as something 
with motivational significance. It refers to things of direct 
financial value (money, shares, a high wage). Social cap-
ital relates to the network of social contacts in which an 
individual operates. The scale of social capital reproduced 
through one’s membership to a group is calibrated to the 
sum of capitals that the other group members can them-
selves lay claim. Participation in a rich or culturally pow-
erful group will reproduce more social capital, therefore, 
than membership in a group with less economic or cultural 
influence. Cultural capital is broken down further into three 
subcategories—embodied, objectivised and institutionalised. 
Embodied cultural capital relates to bodily dispositions and 
habits; objectivised cultural capital to physical artefacts; and 
institutionalised cultural capital to awards and qualifications 
(Bourdieu 1986). Using Bourdieu’s theory can, in this way, 
help understand the full range of economic and non-eco-
nomic capitals that shape practice (Moore 2008).
Bourdieu leans on the metaphor of the ‘rules of the game’ 
to capture the social code that determines which behaviours 
or artefacts are respected, and how different capitals are 
reproduced (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Thomson 2008). 
According to those rules, certain skills, practices, artefacts 
or institutions are considered legitimate, and will be those 
best able to reproduce the different capitals. The amount of 
capital to which an individual can lay claim determines the 
position they occupy in a field’s hierarchy. The field is, thus, 
the arena in which individuals struggle to occupy favourable 
social standing (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).
An individual’s habitus is central to the internalisa-
tion and navigation of these rules (Bourdieu 1983). The 
habitus is the sum of an individual’s behaviours, expe-
riences, outlooks, beliefs and dispositions. The habitus 
is defined as “structured structures predisposed to func-
tion as structuring structures” (Bourdieu 1990, p. 53). 
It is structured insofar as it is the thing subconsciously 
shaped by an individual’s life experiences, education, 
and exposure to a field’s rules and conditions; and it is 
something predisposed to act as structuring structure 
insofar as it is the thing that allows for an individual’s 
agential participation in the world, and as something that 
allows for an individual to creatively and autonomously 
interact with the field’s constituent members, conditions 
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and rules (Wacquant 1989). The habitus is the thing upon 
which one’s experiences are impressed, as well as the 
lens through which one processes and analyses a field’s 
rules and the behaviour of other field members (Maton 
2008). Forged through one’s experience of the world, and 
through one’s internalisation of the field’s rules, it is the 
key to an individual’s attempt to successfully strategise 
their way through the field and to reproduce capital. It 
also the tool an individual uses to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the other members of the field with regards 
to the field’s rules and the social position they occupy 
(Bourdieu 1977; Wacquant 1989).
The rules of the game change in response to new atti-
tudes, knowledges and conditions prominent in a field. 
This can be seen in the context of the agricultural field, 
described above. There has been a historical prioritisation 
of the productivist goals of productivity and intensifica-
tion, and the symbols best able to secure cultural capital 
were those that pertained to their attainment—straight 
ploughing lines, well-kept machinery, neat hedgerows 
(Burton 2004, 2012). More recently, the farmers adopt-
ing organic practices or participating in an AES revealed 
themselves to be the ones creatively responding to the 
policy, economic and social landscape that is increasingly 
favouring the delivery of more diverse farming objec-
tives (Sutherland and Darnhofer 2012; Riley 2016). Such 
practices have achieved a new legitimacy and recognition 
in the rules of the game, and cultural capital can, accord-
ingly, be reproduced through their adoption.
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the habitus has been 
central to understanding how these changes work. The 
habitus subconsciously mutates itself around the field’s 
conditions and rules—even when they are in f lux 
(Bourdieu 1983; Wacquant 2011). An individual can, in 
periods of change, creatively adapt and strategise in a 
given field, even when the conditions and rules to which 
their habitus was accustomed have since changed. New 
artefacts and different behaviours can, in accordance with 
the changing field conditions, enjoy new legitimacy and 
become better able to reproduce different sorts of capital. 
Cultural capital is, in particular, available to those quick-
est and most adept at strategising their way through the 
shifting social landscape (Bourdieu 1996; David 2015).
In combining Bourdieu’s social theory and the good 
farmer concept, researchers have been able to examine 
which behaviours and landscapes reproduce (or lose) 
which capitals, what motivational influence these social 
codes exert, and how these forces change over time. By 
using the good farmer concept and Bourdieu’s social 
theory, this paper provides some answers to the research 
questions described in the paper’s introduction.
Methodology and research context
The analysis presented here comes from a PhD project co-
funded by Natural England (NE), designed to look into 
the long-term social and management changes catalysed 
through participation in an AES. The research is based on 
65 in-depth semi-structured interviews with 40 different 
interviewees (25 of the 40 gave a repeat interview 1 year 
after the initial interview), all of which lasted between 45 
and 90 min. Interviews took place in the summers of 2017 
and 2018. Collection was capped to 65 interviews primarily 
because the data had reached a saturation point—although 
limitations imposed by the PhD timeline were also a minor 
factor. Although data from both interviews and repeat inter-
views are used in this analysis, their sequential aspect relates 
to topics not relevant here and so where respondents gave 
two interviews, they are analysed and presented here as one. 
The repeat interviews did, however, facilitate a members 
check, improving the robustness and trustworthiness of data 
analysis (Birt et al. 2016): second interviews were partially 
framed around the comments made in the first interviews, 
allowing interviewees to refine or revise the perception the 
interviewer had generated about their attitudes and behav-
iours. To further add to the trustworthiness of the analy-
sis, a post-data collection peer debriefing process was also 
completed (Morse et al. 2002; Janesick 2007). Following 
the guidelines described by Barber and Walczak (2009), 
unprocessed and unannotated interview transcripts were 
provided to the manuscript’s second author, with only gen-
eral research themes being provided to initiate the coding 
and analysis process. A full data set of interview transcripts 
was provided, not just the 25% Barber and Walczak (2009) 
recommend as a minimum. The similarities and discrepan-
cies between the respective analyses were then scrutinised, 
allowing room to challenge biases and verify findings.
For both authors, an inductive-deductive hybrid process 
was used for coding. Pre-determined nodes relating to agri-
cultural attitudes towards ELMs and public goods provision 
were used, with additional nodes getting added during suc-
cessive rounds of coding. Not all of the 40 interviewees have 
their contributions used in the presentation of this analy-
sis—although the excerpts used here are reflective of the 
attitudes of the research sample as a whole. Discussion of 
the project’s other findings can be seen at Cusworth (2019) 
and Cusworth (2020). Interviews were kept relevant by a set 
of conversational questions orientated around target themes. 
The interview schedules were subject to the scrutiny of the 
Defra’s survey control unit. As part of the studentship spon-
sorship arrangement, the contact details of the ELS partici-
pants were provided by NE.
The interview sample was heterogenous with arable 
mixed and livestock units all represented. To allow for 
Using the ‘good farmer’ concept to explore agricultural attitudes to the provision of public…
1 3
meaningfully comparable data, the interview schedule 
allowed the interviewees to self-identify which particu-
lar public goods were relevant to their own farms, and 
which goods represented the most and least attractive pros-
pects for them. The majority of the discussion revolved 
around the provision of environmental public goods and, 
to a lesser extent, access to natural areas for recreation, 
and the preservation of cultural heritage. Certain good 
(animal welfare, for example) were only raised by a few 
interviewees. This aspect of the interview design allowed 
participants to discuss their attitudes towards the provi-
sion of public goods through the lens of the good(s) most 
compelling or relevant to them. Systematic research would 
be well placed to offer higher-resolution analysis on the 
ways in which farming identities interface with different 
public goods.
A note is needed on the extent to which the paper is able 
to interrogate the specifics of the country’s transition to the 
public goods model. At the time of interviewing, details 
around the design of ELMs, the Agriculture Bill and the 
Environment Bill were sparse. Although enough was known 
about the policy changes (removal of direct support, prioriti-
sation of public goods) for relevant and insightful discussion 
to take place, certain elements of the post-Brexit agricultural 
regime were not systematically included in the interview 
schedule. These include the 3-tier approach (farm-, local-, 
and landscape-scale interventions) of ELMs (Defra 2020a); 
collaborative scheme contracts (Defra 2020b); and the inclu-
sion of animal welfare and carbon sequestration as public 
goods (Houses of Parliament 2019).
Although these themes were present in the public dis-
course, particularly for the 2018 interviews, they were not 
part of the deductive pre-determined research remit. The 
political situation at the time was highly fluid, with different 
ideas and anxieties around agricultural policy design con-
tinually coming in and out focus. To avoid the interviews 
becoming overly weighed down with speculation, the ques-
tions of the interview schedule were restricted to the higher-
level themes that were less subject to frenetically changeable 
political developments. Whilst it would have been preferable 
to orientate the research around a more ‘finished product’, 
these omissions did not prevent the data collection or analy-
sis from critically engaging with many of the major themes 
of the agricultural policy transition.
The interviews were conducted with participants of the 
Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) portion of the Environ-
mental Stewardship (ES) scheme (excluding those with a 
targeted higher-level component). ES was the main AES 
in England from 2005 to 2014. The author recognises the 
biasing influence this methodology may have created. By 
canvassing opinions from land managers already engaging 
in the provision of public goods, it could be argued that the 
research is bound to generate an unrepresentatively positive 
account of the attitudes towards the varied roles that the 
agricultural industry is being asked to adopt.
The complaint has mileage. ELS’s design, however, com-
bined with characteristics of its participant-base serve to 
mitigate against such biasing effects. ELS was a ‘broad and 
shallow’ scheme, intended to attract high participation by 
offering non-competitive, whole-farm contracts that pro-
moted the adoption of simple management practices (Hodge 
and Reader 2010). At its peak in 2013, ELS covered 72% 
of Utilisable Agricultural Area in England (JNCC 2017). 
The amount of ‘deadweight’ in the scheme was high—with 
many contracts requiring little to no management change 
(Defra 2012). The motivations for participation were not, 
typically, an expression of farmers’ environmentalist com-
mitments or about radical re-orientations of their farm busi-
nesses. Instead, participation was about unlocking easy-
to-access finance for the adoption of simple management 
changes (Cross and Franks 2007; Defra 2012; Hodge and 
Reader 2010). For most participants—amongst the inter-
viewees and across the scheme more generally—ELS was 
their first engagement in an AES. Speaking to its participants 
was used, therefore, as a methodological tool to gauge the 
attitudes of managers engaging in an AES located towards 
the start of the spectrum of the public goods model, and 
to assess their attitudes as the subsidy system progresses 
along that continuum. The author nevertheless recognises 
the influencing impact of this research design.
The interviews were split evenly across two case study 
areas shown in Fig. 1. The case study areas were made up of 
groupings of National Character Areas—the administrative 
units used in the administration of AESs. The two areas were 
chosen to reflect areas of different farm systems—with the 
Eastern area having a higher concentration of arable farm-
ing and the Midlands area, livestock and mixed farming. 
The interviewees represented an even spread of small and 
large farms, operating a range of livestock, mixed and arable 
farms. The responses from the two case study areas are not 
contrasted with each other, nor are the responses of inter-
viewees with different farm sizes or systems.
This particular decision mirrors a methodology employed 
in previous good farmer related research (Burton et al. 2008; 
Burton 2012). Namely, to use different case study areas to 
identify which features of the good farmer are common 
amongst farmers in different areas, on different systems and 
of different sizes—not as a means of generating a compara-
tive study of which ideals exist where in the industry. To 
reflect this, the interviews from the different areas are pre-
sented and analysed as one. Again, future research would be 
well placed to develop more granular analysis of the good 
farmer concept and how it might apply to farmers from dif-
ferent area operating farms of different sizes or systems.
In the presentation of the data, interviewee’s attribut-
able details are removed, and each interviewee is assigned 
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a random interview number. To give some character to the 
interviewee’s comments, though, a brief precis of their farm-
ing biography is given (size, system, tenancy).
Findings and discussion
The ‘good farmer concept’ and the provision 
of public goods
The relationship the interviewed farmers had towards the 
provision of public goods was, by and large, positive. That 
positivity was, however, contingent on the financial remu-
neration associated with the provision of those goods and 
the perceived benefits it could offer for the maintenance of 
a financially viable farm. Especially given the sub-text of 
the public goods transition in which ELMs participation is 
set to be the only financing made available to farmers, this 
is perhaps unsurprising. Consider the following excerpts:
Interviewee 28, a large arable farmer who undertakes a 
lot of local contracting work explained:
I don’t give a damn so long as we’re paid for it… If I 
can make as much money growing flowers, I’m happy 
to grow flowers.
Interviewee 18, who manages a medium-sized mixed-
farm with a significant diversification arm to the business:
If you paid us more to have a wild meadow full of 
lovely flowers than grow wheat, I’d be terribly happy 
with that.
And Interviewee 3, who manages a large estate with 
traditional parkland grazing and arable land, speaks to the 
implications the policy transition has on farming identities:
It [reduction in direct subsidisation, introduction of 
ELMs] is definitely a step towards becoming envi-
ronmental stewards rather than farmers which doesn’t 
bother me…I’ve been brought up that the farm is a 
business and if they’re going to pay you to crop it envi-
ronmentally, then that’s the niche to go into.
The cultural resistance historically associated with the 
provision of public goods and the landscapes they produce 
(Burton et al. 2008) has abated to the extent that the farmers 
are willing to engage in that model, provided the financial 
remuneration is pitched at the correct level. Even the prob-
lematic ‘untidiness’ reported by various studies about the 
willingness to deliver environmental goods (Kohler et al. 
2014) do not appear to be relevant. The “meadow full of 
lovely flowers” cited by Interviewee 18 is the precise sort of 
untidy, unfarmed aesthetic that has elsewhere been recorded 
as the type of management practice that undermines farm-
ers’ inclination to deliver public goods. That management 
practice is used here, however, to exemplify a willingness 
to engage.
Shifting agro-economic conditions have propelled 
changes elsewhere in the rules of the agricultural field. The 
consumer preferences that have carved out a viable market-
ing niche for organic produce have seen organic management 
become capable of reproducing embodied cultural capi-
tal for participating managers (Sutherland and Darnhofer 
2012). The primacy of managing a viable business in the 
good farmer concept (Sutherland 2013), is here recasting 
the reputation and prestige associated with the delivery of 
public goods. The managers are mindful of the increasing 
economic importance of having a public goods element on 
the farm and are projecting their respect onto the practices 
that can help unlock that money. The good farmer is suf-
ficiently agile to respond to these changing economic reali-
ties such that cultural capital is not risked, as it once was, 
through the adoption of practices that pertain to the produc-
tion of non-agricultural goods and untidy landscapes. The 
reformulated rules do not imply a conflation of public goods 
provisioning and cultural capital reproduction; but rather, a 
more complete integration of agricultural productivity and 
the delivery of public goods as behaviours integral to run-
ning a viable farm business.
In Bourdieusian terms, the rules of the game have shifted 
to accommodate the field conditions that increasingly dictate 
how participation in public goods schemes pertains to the 
Fig. 1  Case Study Map
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financial sustainability of a farm unit. Although the Brexit 
transition has provided an additional injection of impetus, 
the economic and policy transition towards the public goods 
model, has happened at such a rate that the changes have 
been internalised into habituses of the managers. ELS’s 
widespread uptake has been particularly noteworthy in nor-
malising public goods subsidisation in the agricultural sector 
(Cusworth 2020). As a result, none of the interviewed farm-
ers expressed concerns around the principles of the shift to 
a public goods model, or the practices or landscapes associ-
ated with public goods provisioning (although it is important 
to remember that the interviewees were engaged with the 
‘broad and shallow’ design of ELS, and so didn’t have to 
make any drastic public goods-orientated changes in how 
they managed their farms). Concerns were, instead, raised 
around the scale of remuneration set to be made available 
through the new scheme.
Interviewee 22, a younger farmer who had recently taken 
charge of the family’s medium-sized arable farm, explained 
some of these reservations. Despite being highly receptive 
to the idea of basing his farm’s business on the provision of 
public goods, he explained that:
Any time they’re going to taking down money [through 
direct subsidisation] you’re never going to get as much 
out the other end [for providing public goods].
Such findings stand in contrast to those of Howley et al. 
(2014), who found that farmers’ willingness to provide 
public goods was outweighed by the public’s willingness to 
finance them. The difference in findings is neatly summed 
up by the assessment offered by Interviewee 21, an arable 
farmer with rented and owned land:
My quandary is whether society is happy to pay for 
those goods, because there’s a large part of society 
feels entitled to them.
And by Interviewee 17, who manages a medium-sized 
dairy herd, referring to one public good in particular—pro-
viding access to the environment. Again, the grievance is 
not about undertaking the work to provide the good, but a 
mismatch between people’s willingness to pay and the goods 
they expect agriculture to be providing:
People think ‘why should they [farmers] get all this 
money?’ But people expect to drive through the coun-
tryside, and expect the bridal paths to be open, to be 
able to walk through it, with everything pretty and 
nice!
Whilst the public may be theoretically amenable to the 
idea of paying for public goods, because of the managers’ 
understanding of the how expensive those goods are, they 
remain sceptical that sufficient funds will be on offer. Other 
fears about the move to the public goods model were also 
highlighted. Here, Interviewee 37, another larger arable unit 
with both owned and rented land, explains his fears around 
the increased surveillance that comes when accepting money 
through public financing:
The whole policy seems to be “we are giving you pub-
lic money for public goods.” Fine. “We will enforce 
that by penalising you if you get it wrong, we won’t 
come and help you, we won’t come and advise you.” 
It’s a small carrot and a big stick.
Interviewee 21, who runs an arable farm and takes on 
contract work for other farmers, raises a similar point. The 
interaction with government services that comes with the 
public money for public goods model may frustrate the sec-
tor’s willingness to engage once the direct support has been 
removed:
[Once direct subsidisation is gone] there’s less reason 
to get the interaction with the government agencies – 
the further arm’s length the better… It’s the triggering 
of inspections.
There was, however, a general acceptance around the need 
to demonstrate the additionality of public goods subsidy. 
Comparing the evidence needed for his ELS and subsequent 
CS contract, Interviewee 4’s reflections are more representa-
tive of the research sample’s attitude towards subsidisation, 
evidence provisioning and government interaction:
The ELS scheme… you weren’t really answerable to 
anybody. With the mid-tier, they are asking for a lot 
more proof for what you’ve done.
Justifiably do you think? [interviewer]
Well if it’s public money, yeah definitely!
Interviewee 26—who manages a mixed farm with his 
son—typifies the pragmatism the interviewees felt towards 
the changing subsidy arrangement. As public goods money 
becomes the only support available to a sector that has 
grown accustomed to some income support, the industry’s 
willingness to engage will surely follow:
If farmers have an opportunity to get paid to do some-
thing, and they believe it makes commercial sense, a 
lot of farmers, once you get over the transition will say 
“if it’s do this and get some money versus do nothing 
and get no money, as long as the money is reasonable, 
I’d better do that.”
Land sparing, land sharing and the re‑orientation 
of productivist dispositions
That farmers are amenable to the public goods model, and 
that it is compatible with the good farmer ideal does not fully 
capture the more complex reality. Consider the comments 
 G. Cusworth, J. Dodsworth 
1 3
of Interviewee 29, who manages a large mixed-farming 
estate, discussing his perspective on the sector’s willingness 
to engage in future subsidisation. The discussion here was 
conducted in relation to the repurposing of ELS options for 
use in a future CS or for ELMs contract:
If you pick a farm in the middle of the Fens, I think 
those guys will be taking their strips out [of any future 
scheme and back into production], because I think 
they’ll take a view that they can grow a high value crop 
because it’s still pretty good land. But if you take a 
rural estate, perhaps one that has been an ex-livestock 
farm and has gone all arable, with some small fields, 
and shady corners by the sides of woods, I think those 
will be the guys who will be leaving what they put in 
[through ELS].
Interviewee 16, a farmer with a small mixed farm, 
responds to a similar question:
If the money is good enough, it means you haven’t 
got to do the [agricultural] work. It’s a win–win for 
everybody. And there’s parts of the farm – everybody 
has got them – that are so marginal it’s not worth pro-
ducing.
Certain management practices are expected or acceptable 
on certain parts of the farm that are not respected or accept-
able on others. The rules of the game are subtly tuned to the 
land in question, such that the management decisions that 
are best placed to reproduce cultural capital on some farm, 
or on some part of a farm, are different to the management 
decisions best able to reproduce cultural capital on others. 
These reflections are primarily rooted in the economics 
of farm management. If there are areas of poor land that 
offer lower economic returns through agricultural produc-
tion, then the opportunity to be paid to provide some pub-
lic good represents savvy farm business management. For 
a farm’s prime agricultural land, where economic capital 
is best secured through traditional agricultural production, 
there is recognition and respect for those prioritising food 
production. Admitting and integrating some public goods 
orientated subsidisation onto certain areas of the farm lends 
an additional legitimacy to other areas dedicated to food 
production. The judgements passed by the above interview-
ees reveal how cultural capital is available for managers 
embodying this management adaptability.
Whilst this ‘public goods-land quality-cultural capital’ 
matrix may seem intuitive, it warrants some unpacking. The 
idea of land sharing and land sparing can here be used to 
give expression to this particular aspect of the good farmer 
ideal. Land sharing relates to the practice of co-locating 
agricultural production and other public goods provision 
on the same land. Land sparing relates to the practice of 
separating where food is produced, and where other public 
goods are delivered (Fischer et al. 2008). The two are fre-
quently presented as binary and opposing visions for how 
agriculture might best meet the competing pressures to pro-
duce food and provide a healthy environment. Should the 
negative externalities of agriculture be reduced, per unit 
area of land, by ‘de-intensifying agricultural’ production, 
thereby providing a more generous allowance for biodiver-
sity and water quality to recover on farmland (land sharing); 
or should good agricultural land be focussed on maximising 
food production, leaving the remainder to be put to dedicated 
environmental or other public goods usage (land sparing)?
The responses of the interviewees—typified in the above 
excerpts—show how a preference for the land sparing model 
has been encoded into the rules of the game. The regard 
the above interviewees expressed for managers maintain-
ing or removing their ELS scheme features is calibrated to 
the quality and type of land put in in the first place. If the 
land is of high quality, and can be easily integrated into a 
field’s cultivation, then its appropriate use is in agricultural 
production—hence the recognition and regard for managers 
returning such land previously in the ELS scheme into pro-
duction. For marginal land, or land that is not easily farmed, 
there is a recognition of its poor agricultural potential and 
its appropriate use is for it to be contributing to the environ-
mental ‘output’ of the farm and to be used in some public 
goods-orientated subsidisation. Embodied cultural capital is, 
in this way, available for the managers identifying these var-
ied and appropriate potentials and maximising their respec-
tive outputs.
This preference for land sparing options, it is argued, is 
the result of conflicting claimants on agricultural identities. 
The historical preference for productivist objectives and 
the corresponding food-producing identity that previous 
research has attributed to the farming population (Silvasti 
2003; Burton 2004) is clearly still in effect. Where food can 
be effectively produced, then the appropriate use is for it to 
be committed to concerted food production. Cultural capital 
flows accordingly. The above farmers nevertheless recog-
nise the business value of integrating some public goods 
element onto their farm, and accept the implicit duty that 
agriculture has to better manage its environmental impact 
(Cusworth 2020). The finances made available through 
AESs, especially as they allow participants to choose where 
on the farm the scheme options are located, offer farmers 
the opportunity to live out these dual personalities, allowing 
them to service the broader imperative of running a success-
ful farm business. This ‘public goods provider’ identity has 
been integrated—or, more accurately, been given good room 
to co-exist—with the extant productivist farming identity.
These findings also make for heartening reading for 
those interested in the wider objectives of the policy 
transition. Whilst ELMs and the Agriculture Bill are fre-
quently discussed in terms of their prioritisation of public 
Using the ‘good farmer’ concept to explore agricultural attitudes to the provision of public…
1 3
goods (Bateman and Balmford 2018), agricultural pro-
ductivity remains an important element in the country’s 
farming strategy (Defra 2018b, 2020a). The above analysis 
demonstrates the important role farmers have in brokering 
and delivering on the sometimes antithetical objectives 
of having a highly productive and sustainable food pro-
duction system. Especially given the additional decision-
making influence applicants are being afforded in ELMs’ 
more results-orientated and the targeted application design 
(Defra 2020a), the expertise individuals farmers have in 
knowing how agricultural productivity and public goods 
provisioning can be optimised on their farms will be of 
major value.
The account of Interviewee 17 neatly captures the inter-
play of the public goods provider and food producer identi-
ties—and how the finances available for the provision of 
public goods lubricates their co-existence as two forces 
contributing to the farm’s financial stability. Again, the 
preference for the land sparing model, in which one’s food 
production and one’s public goods delivery are located on 
different parts of the farm (cf. the delivery of both on the 
same parcels) are in evidence when he explains that:
You only do that for a proportion of the farm – it’s 
nice to see the flowers up there on the wispy meadow, 
but you wouldn’t want to see it all over the place.
A note here is needed about scale and resolution. There 
is ongoing debate—and considerable ambiguity—around 
the spatial scale at which land sparing interventions occur. 
As Fischer et al. (2013, p. 153) note, “sparing is often 
assumed to imply a large geographic extent and a coarse 
spatial grain… However land sparing has also been used 
to refer to conservation measures only visible at a fine 
spatial grain, including field margins or land set aside… 
[so] it is often unclear when sharing becomes sparing”. It 
is important to understand that in attributing a preference 
for land sparing interventions to the good farmer ideal, this 
more general definition (one that includes both fine and 
coarse spatial grain strategies) is employed.
Larger-scale resolution land sparing interventions were, 
however, also well regarded. Interviewees discussed how 
the need for the sector to produce both agricultural and 
public goods played out across different regional and inter-
farm (from farm to farm), as well as intra-farm (within 
a given farm) scales. Whole farms operating in certain 
landscape types were identified as those that should be 
adopting a business model predicated on the delivery of 
public goods, whilst others were identified as those that 
can legitimately be making no public goods allowances. 
Interviewee 4, who manages a medium-sized arable farm, 
offers his assessment of the role future subsidies will play 
in how he manages his farm:
I’m quite happy on a farm like this to go down the 
environmental route, because it isn’t a productive farm, 
and it isn’t a viable arable farm in its own right. Not 
like some of the farms in East Anglia, huge farms – 
they probably stand up on their own right.
His neutral assessment of both the hypothetical East 
Anglian farms adopting a model predicated on productiv-
ity, and the management plans he has for his own farm is 
revealing. He is not critical or supportive of either model in 
abstract, and his respect is not necessarily earnt through the 
pursuit of one model or the other. Instead, the legitimacy 
of each model is predicated on the landscape characteris-
tics of the farm, and the determining role this has in select-
ing which management practices are able to deliver on the 
farm’s potential. The good farmer concept implies an ability 
to step back from one’s unit to assess where it fits in with 
the broader strategic ambitions for the country’s agricultural 
sector, and how the farm’s business model (i.e., the extent 
to which it produced public goods and/or agricultural out-
puts) should be designed. The censure or respect a farmer 
is liable to receive vis-à-vis their engagement with public 
goods subsidisation is highly context-dependent—an equa-
tion that cannot happen in isolation from the quality of the 
land and its different potentials. Similar to the analysis of 
Sutherland and Darnhofer (2012), being able to ‘creatively 
respond’ to the changing conditions in the agriculture field 
(here concerning the dual pressures of contributing to a pro-
ductive and sustainable industry) is an important predictor 
in the reproduction of cultural capital.
Reflecting on how the farm sector’s varied obligations can 
be met, Interviewee 33, who runs a medium-sized owned 
arable unit, explains:
You’ve got to sort of ring fence it [subsidisation for 
public goods] and say “actually we need to have a bal-
anced agricultural world, where there’s some that’s 
really commercial and some that’s less commercial.”
This location-sensitive vision of what constitutes good 
and appropriate management mirrors the research of Jonge-
neel et al. (2008). They found that Dutch farmers’ willing-
ness to adopt non-food orientated business models, espe-
cially regarding tourism- and environmental-related goods 
were location dependent. Farmers in the west of the country, 
in areas of higher environmental and tourism value, were 
more willing to adopt such public goods orientated business 
models than those in the east, where the agricultural output 
is traditionally higher and more intensive.
This balancing act is captured by Interviewee 12, who 
runs a small farm consisting mostly of grazing land:
Not every farm would suit that [a business model 
predicated on subsidisation and the provision of pub-
lic goods]. My land suits it, because it’s that type of 
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farm, small fields, plenty of hedges, and the spinney 
[a small wooded area]. But if you’ve just got 130 acres 
of flat arable land, why are they going to get anything 
for environmental?
And Interviewee 26, who owns and runs a large arable 
holding:
If you look at a Norfolk farmer farming on light sandy 
soils, compared to a Somerset farmer doing mainly 
dairy, and worried about not having too much rain –the 
two are so totally different that you couldn’t conceiv-
ably think they would have the same thoughts on these 
things [providing public goods, and going into ELM].
The above accounts are, in part, prompted by the eco-
nomic turbulence that the removal of direct subsidy will 
deliver for many farmers across the UK (Helm 2017; Defra 
2018c; Mason 2019). The above interviewees are engag-
ing in some speculative accounts-keeping, working out 
how their—and other’s—farms might avoid the economic 
bottom-line. Namely, by boosting the agricultural and public 
goods arms of their business, or the prioritisation of one at 
the expense of the other. Similar to the comments Arnott 
et al. (2019) make in relation to the Brexit process, the perils 
for farm businesses manifest in the redirection of direct sup-
port to public goods subsidisation has a natural fit with land 
sparing interventions in which farmers can more effectively 
maximise their different revenue streams—a synergy made 
more plausible by the amenability of farming psychologies 
to land sparing practices.
Some key elements of the productivist identity are, it is 
argued, being repurposed to navigate modern economic and 
social pressures. There is a mission creep of the productivist 
aspect of the good farmer concept (with its attendant prefer-
ence for efficiency, scale, intensification, and specialisation) 
resulting in the annexation of the provision of public goods 
into the list of accepted and valorised outputs. Or seen from 
the obverse, the budding public goods provider identity is 
being coloured by the long-standing regard for efficiency 
and productivity.
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of how the habitus performs 
in periods of social change is instructive. The habitus is an 
inscription of history that provides an inertia in determining 
who an individual is and how they act over time (Bourdieu 
1990; Maton 2008). Changes in an individual’s habitus occur 
only to the extent required by the shifting field conditions 
(Bourdieu 2000). Individuals creatively respond to those 
changes (Reay 2004; Sutherland and Darnhofer 2012) whilst 
preserving, as much as is practicable, pre-existing modes of 
being (Kerr and Robinson 2009). Here, the long-standing 
preference for, and celebration of, scale and efficiency are 
being maintained in farming habituses as they creatively 
respond to the new social and economic realities manifest 
in the transition to a public goods model of subsidisation. 
Farmers are looking to maximise their output, engage in 
economies of scale, intensify and make efficient—although 
here in a setting in which public goods and agricultural com-
modities are all implicated. Related to the analysis of farm 
benchmarking groups, the competitiveness and desire for 
performance improvements embedded in farming commu-
nities can be harnessed for environmental and public goods 
gains (de Snoo 2006).
This excerpt from Interviewee 22—the younger farmer 
who now manages the family’s large arable farm—captures 
how extant productivist preferences for specialisation and 
efficiency, historically reserved for agricultural productivity, 
are being extended to the delivery of public goods.
We’re trying to do [pollinator and bird mix plots] on 
a field scale. We’ve got an 11-acre field and a 3-acre 
field, and we just do the whole lot. We treat it like a 
crop [emphasis added].
Conclusion
Alongside the paper’s contribution to the iterative study of 
agricultural attitudes and identities, the paper’s findings have 
direct policy implications, including for some of the ‘priority 
themes’ in ELMs research and development (Defra 2020c). 
The synergy between farming identities and land sparing 
strategies might have a telling influence on the country’s 
agricultural policy transition. ELMs is being designed to 
afford farmers greater autonomy in mediating and deliver-
ing the dual needs for a sustainable and productive agricul-
tural sector on their farms. The proclivity for farmers to seek 
maximisation, efficiency and optimisation may help get the 
most out of the country’s farmland—both in terms of food 
produced and public goods provided.
The preference for ‘sparing’ parcels of less-productive 
land for public goods provision augurs well for other aspects 
of ELMs design, too. A number of ELMs trials are exploring 
approaches to Land Management Plans, which at the farm 
scale will include some form of natural capital audit and 
accompanying farm business plan. See Northern Uplands 
ELMs Test and Trial report (Landscapes for Life 2020) for 
an example. In reviewing and mapping their land, managers 
will have to actively consider the areas of the farm where 
the production of environmental, cultural and agricultural 
goods are most suited. In doing so, they may acknowledge 
new kinds of value in areas of their farms they might previ-
ously have discounted—a prospect already attracting some 
excitement in the farming press (Harris 2019). Although 
the natural capital approach represents the further expan-
sion of market logics into environmental protection (and thus 
inherits a whole host of criticism—see Arsel and Buscher 
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2012 for discussion), it is a model that has good fit with the 
business-minded and efficiency-seeking aspects of agricul-
tural identities.
Many previous studies have linked a willingness to par-
ticipate in an AES with the level of financial remuneration 
(Lastra-Bravo et al. 2015). That the good farmer’s amena-
bility to public goods provisioning stems primarily from 
the business advantages a scheme can offer, the link is here 
re-iterated. The (perceived) imbalance between the “small 
carrot and big stick” (to quote Interviewee 37 again) must 
be redressed if ELMs is to represent an attractive payment 
opportunity for the country’s farmers. The authors share 
Defra’s concern that basing payment rates in Tier 1 of ELM 
on income foregone alone may not encourage the desired 
level of uptake (Defra 2020a): payments must also offset 
the more intangible costs of participation, such as the nega-
tive pressures of scheme bureaucracy and threat of scheme 
penalties.
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